Table of Contents
When responsibility for violence is shared among contractors, militias, and shadow networks, accountability fades — and so does the path to peace.
Historically, most interstate wars have been fought by the regular enlisted soldiers of a country. When these soldiers were ordered into battle the cost of war was impossible to ignore. The ruling dispensation was responsible for the consequences to take its citizens to war. The direct connection between the decision to wage war and the sacrifices of ordinary soldiers often acted as a restraint and, eventually, created pressure to move towards conflict termination or negotiate a ceasefire. That relationship is steadily weakening.
Over the last three decades, governments have increasingly relied on private military companies, mercenaries, proxy militias, and state-sponsored non-state actors to fight their battles. American contractors operated extensively in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia relied on the Wagner Group in Ukraine, Syria, and several African countries while also employing North Korean military personnel. Pakistan has long used militant proxies in South Asia. Criminal networks have trafficked or deceived foreign nationals, including Indians, into conflicts thousands of kilometres away. Men and women recruited from towns and villages around the world are quietly sent into conflicts that governments prefer not to own. Outsourcing violence has become a defining feature of modern conflict. While these actors may offer governments flexibility and plausible deniability, they also make wars harder to end. When responsibility is shared among contractors, militias, and shadow networks, accountability fades, negotiations become more complicated, and peace becomes increasingly elusive.
A History of Borrowed Soldiers
History shows that outsourcing war is not new. Ancient empires hired mercenaries when they lacked manpower or loyalty. Medieval Italian city-states depended on professional soldiers known as condottieri, while imperial powers routinely recruited foreign regiments. The rise of the modern nation-state changed this model. By the late nineteenth century, professional national armies backed by mass conscription became the norm. After the Second World War, international institutions reinforced the idea that the state alone should possess the legitimate monopoly over organised violence. Yet cracks soon appeared. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union rarely fought each other directly. Instead, they armed and funded client states, insurgent movements, and proxy forces across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Responsibility for violence became blurred long before the emergence of today’s private military companies. The post-Cold War era accelerated this trend. Globalisation made it easier to recruit fighters across borders and move money through complex financial networks. Advances in technology also amplified the operational effects of small, specialised forces.
Weakening the Feedback Loop
The result is a fragmented battlefield and uncertainty having profound implications for peace. Over a period of time political leaders realised that outsourcing combat reduced the domestic backlash associated with casualties among regular troops undermining accountability. When national armies fight, casualties send unmistakable signals about the costs of war. Citizens demand answers, political leaders face pressure, and adversaries can gauge how much pain a government is willing to bear. Outsourced forces weaken this feedback mechanism. Contractors operate outside public scrutiny, while proxy groups often answer to hidden sponsors rather than elected governments. In Ukraine, Wagner operated alongside Russian forces while simultaneously pursuing its own commercial interests. Its semi-autonomous structure complicated ceasefire efforts and allowed Moscow to maintain a degree of plausible deniability until internal tensions with its commander erupted into open confrontation. Lately, opponents struggle to identify who truly controls events on the battlefield, making negotiations more difficult. Governments can deny involvement even while directing operations behind the scenes, encouraging risk-taking and prolonging conflict.
“When responsibility is shared among contractors, militias, and shadow networks, accountability fades, negotiations become more complicated, and peace becomes increasingly elusive.”
A Battlefield Crowded with Interests
Modern conflicts rarely involve just two opposing states. Instead, they bring together governments, private military companies, local militias, tribal leaders, criminal organisations, and foreign sponsors. Each has its own interests. A government may seek a ceasefire, while a militia leader profits from continued instability. A contractor paid by the mission may benefit from an extended deployment. A local warlord, as it has happened in Africa repeatedly, may see peace as a threat to his influence and revenue. Economics also plays a powerful role. For some actors, war is not simply a political instrument but a business model. Private military companies earn revenue from prolonged deployments. Resource-rich governments may exchange mining rights or commercial concessions for security services. The Wagner Group demonstrated this model by combining military operations with access to gold mines, oil fields, and other natural resources across parts of Africa. Pakistan’s long-standing support for militant proxies in Kashmir and Afghanistan transformed conventional interstate rivalry into decades of low-intensity conflict, where local actors developed their own political and economic interests that have modified the original strategic objectives. In such cases, conflict itself becomes profitable, creating powerful incentives to resist peace. The more actors involved, the harder it becomes to reach an agreement that satisfies everyone. Any one of them can derail negotiations if peace threatens their interests.
Law Without Accountability
Proxies also offered governments a way to pursue strategic objectives while avoiding legal and diplomatic consequences. Legal ambiguity arising due to myriad types of forces operating in a fragmented command structure itself creates another obstacle. International law has evolved around the assumption that states are responsible for the conduct of their armed forces. Outsourcing of organised state sponsored violence blurs that principle. If a mercenary team commits atrocities, onus of responsibility gets diffused between the contractor and the sponsoring government. These uncertainties complicate investigations, delay justice, and undermine reconciliation. Victims are understandably reluctant to accept peace when those responsible remain beyond the reach of accountability. In Libya, Mali, and the Central African Republic, Russian mercenary operations have blurred responsibility for human rights abuses and complicated international mediation.
Adapting Policy to a Fragmented Battlefield
If outsourcing war by nation states has become a permanent feature of international security environment, policy must adapt accordingly. Governments and international institutions need stronger legal frameworks governing private military companies and mercenary activity. Rules of state responsibility should be updated so that sponsors cannot hide behind deniable intermediaries. Peace negotiations must also evolve. Talking only to governments is no longer enough. Durable settlements increasingly require engagement with proxy groups, economic stakeholders, and other non-state actors who possess the ability to sustain or disrupt peace. Equally important is targeting the financial networks that make outsourced warfare profitable. Sanctions, tighter financial oversight, and restrictions on resource generation can reduce the economic incentives that fuel prolonged violence.
Conclusion: Restoring Accountability
Outsourcing war does not inevitably make peace impossible. Private security companies can contribute to stability in certain transitional environments, and proxies may sometimes prevent direct confrontation between major powers. But there is an undeniable trade-off. When governments are insulated from the political and human costs of deploying their own troops, they face fewer incentives to end a conflict. Wars become less transparent, less accountable, and far more difficult to conclude. The battlefield of the twenty-first century is no longer occupied solely by states. It is crowded with contractors, militias, mercenaries, criminal networks, and commercial interests. If policymakers want peace that lasts, they must recognise this new reality, restore accountability, bring shadow actors into negotiations, and sever the economic lifelines that allow war to become a profitable enterprise rather than a tragic last resort.
“If policymakers want peace that lasts, they must restore accountability, bring shadow actors into negotiations, and sever the economic lifelines that allow war to become a profitable enterprise.”
References
- Human Rights Watch (2023)
- UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (2022)
- UN Special Rapporteurs (2022)
- Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2024
- Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Annual Report 2023
- 116th U.S. Congress, Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020.
About the Author
Lt Gen SK Saini, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM (Retd)
41st Vice Chief of Army Staff, Indian Army (2020–2021)
Lt Gen Satinder Kumar Saini served as the 41st Vice Chief of Army Staff of the Indian Army from January 2020 to January 2021, providing policy direction for all active, reserve, and training commands while managing the bulk of the Army’s capital and revenue procurement. He was a key member of the core group that managed the Ladakh standoff following the Galwan clash and served as the primary coordinator between the Ministry of Defence, DRDO, and various think tanks.
Prior to VCOAS, he served as GOC-in-C, Southern Command, leading over 250,000 personnel and overseeing operational readiness along the Pakistan border following the Pulwama attack. His career includes tenures as Commandant of the Indian Military Academy, faculty at the National Defence College, and Brigadier General Staff for 15 Corps in Srinagar. He holds an MSc in Defence Studies and two MPhil degrees, and has been awarded the PVSM, AVSM, YSM, and VSM. Since retiring, he serves as Strategic Advisor for RRP S4E Innovation.